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FINDING WITTGENSTEIN AT THE CORE
OF THE RULE OF RECOGNITION
Anthony J. Sebok*
HL.A. Hart's 1957 Holmes Lecture at Harvard Law School, Posi-
tivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, was clearly an at-
tempt by Hart to refocus the postwar debate over positivism.1
The lecture dealt with challenges to positivism based on its alleged con-
nections with a variety of unpopular jurisprudential views. Hart chal-
lenged the claim, made by many, that there was a necessary relationship
between positivism and Bentham and Austin's "command theory,"
Langdellian formalism, and Nazi totalitarianism. 2 In doing so, Hart
cleared the ground for a new picture of positivism based on the idea of
law as a "union of primary and secondary rules" that did not ground law
in either the threat of force or fictive abstractions, a picture that he would
fully develop in The Concept of Law, which was published in 1961. 3 But
Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals was more than a cri-
tique of positivism's critics; it set out some of the elements that would
form the backbone of The Concept of Law. In Section III of Positivism
and the Separation of Law and Morals, Hart set out his view of discretion
in adjudication, based, in part, on a certain picture of language. 4 Hart's
view, that judges exercise no discretion in a law's "core" and legislate in
its "penumbra," has captured the attention of many of positivism's critics
since the lecture was published in the Harvard Law Review. 5 While Hart
may have done much good for positivism by challenging those who would
associate it with formalism and totalitarianism, he nonetheless opened up
a whole new set of difficulties for positivism by associating it with a view
of discretion rooted in the idea that language was characterized by the
phenomena of the "core" and the "penumbra."
* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. B.A., Cornell University; J.D., Yale
University.
1. See H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 593 (1958).
2. See id.
3. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994).
4. Hart, supra note 1, at 606-15.
5. See, e.g., STEVEN 1. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH 181-83 (1992); RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 39 (1985); Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law,
69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 794-95 (1989); Steven L. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, Meta-
phoric Reasoning, and the Cognitive Stakes for Law, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1172-80
(1989); Michael S. Moore, The Semantics of Judging, 54 S. CAL. L. REV. 151, 273-75 (1981);
Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L.
REV. 630 (1958).
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In this Article, I will examine the role that Hart's view of discretion
played in the development of his theory of positivism. This Article has
five sections. First, I will situate Hart's discussion of discretion in the
larger argument of Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, and
I will show that Hart's presentation of his views on discretion were di-
rected mostly against Fuller's theory of the morality of law. Second, I will
explain why Hart believed that his rejection of Fuller's theory of the mo-
rality of law presupposed that all rules possessed a core and a penumbra.
Third, I will argue that Hart relied upon a Wittgensteinian concept of
rules when he developed the picture of discretion that he used to attack
Fuller. Fourth, I will argue that Hart's Wittgensteinian picture of rules,
by itself, did a poor job of explaining legal discretion, and that this prob-
lem was pointed out by the legal process scholars Henry Hart and Albert
Sacks. Fifth, I will argue that the problems with Hart's picture of legal
discretion were cured once Hart adopted the distinction between primary
and secondary rules in The Concept of Law. The point of this Article is
simple: Hart's concept of discretion in Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals was a profound but incomplete step in the right direc-
tion. Hart's distinction between the core and the penumbra should only
be judged in the context of his model of rules, which he did not develop
until after Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals was
published.
It is important to remember the context in which Hart delivered Posi-
tivism and the Separation of Law and Morals. Positivism had been at-
tacked from two sides. On one side, the realists had attacked Austin and
Bentham for the sin of analytical jurisprudence, which they associated
with Langdell and formalism. On the other side, various natural lawyers
attacked Austin and Bentham for the sin of uncoupling law and morality,
which they associated with totalitarianism and moral relativism. In Sec-
tion III of Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, Hart dis-
cussed the realist attack. What is interesting, as we shall see, is that Hart
had trouble keeping separate in his mind the difference between his real-
ist and natural law critics, and his minor lapses of analysis here tell us
something important about his own views on the nature of rules.
The realists, Hart noted, correctly understood that legal reasoning
could not be "wholly logical."' 6 At some point, observed Hart, a law-
applier "must make a decision which is not dictated to him."'7 The reason
why a legal decision cannot be wholly logical is because many of the rules
upon which judges would base their logical operations cannot operate as
premises in a classical syllogism. This is because many of these rules are
sometimes irreducibly vague in their meaning: for example, the rule "no
6. See Hart, supra note 1, at 606.
7. Id. at 607.
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vehicles in the park" (call this Rule P) may or may not mean that bicycles
are prohibited from the park, and there is nothing in the words of Rule P
that can tell us which it is.8 If no legal rule can tell the rule-applier
whether Rule P prohibits bicycles, and the rule-applier nonetheless an-
swers that question, then according to Hart, the law-applier "must take
the responsibility" of deciding what Rule P means by using a non-legal
reason to pick a meaning. 9
Hart quickly pointed out that nothing in the foregoing paragraph was
inconsistent with Austin's views; in fact, a critical moment in analytical
jurisprudence was when Austin had rejected the myth that legal reasoning
was a matter of pure deduction and nothing more. 10 But why, then, had
the realists been so convinced that positivism was committed to the myth
of deduction? Hart offered this explanation:
[If] men cannot live by deduction alone... what is it then that makes
such decisions correct or at least better than alternative decisions?
Again, it seems true to say that the criterion which makes a decision
sound in such cases is some concept of what the law ought to be; it is
easy to slide from that into saying that it must be a moral judgment
about what law ought to be. So here we touch upon a point of neces-
sary "intersection between law and morals" which demonstrates the
falsity or, at any rate, the misleading character of the [positivists']
emphatic insistence on the separation [between] law as it is and [law
as it] ought to be."I
Under this reading, realists thought that positivism insisted on not just
the analytical separation of law and morality but their practical separa-
tion as well. According to the realists, the positivist forbade judges from
acting on the basis of social policy in order to prevent the confusion of
law and morals, and the only way to prohibit judges from acting on social
policy was to convince them that judging was a will-less, deductive pro-
cess. 12 But, as Hart pointed out, a positivist could insist on the separation
of law and morality if the consideration of social policy occurred only
when legal meaning was vague and the judge used nonlegal reasons to
choose between outcomes. 13 Why could the realist not see that?
According to Hart, the realist could not conceive of a jurisprudence
that insisted on the separation of law and morality and permitted the con-
sideration of social policy because the realist believed that:
the social policies and purposes to which judges should appeal if
their decisions are to be rational, are themselves to be considered as
8. See id.
9. Id.
10. See id. at 608-09.
11. Id. at 608.
12. See, e.g., Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605, 615-16
(1908) (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)). 1 discuss the reasons behind the
realists' misrepresentation of nineteenth-century positivism as a form of deductive concep-
tualism in Anthony J. Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2054, 2068-72
(1995).
13. See Hart, supra note 1, at 612.
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part of the law .... [Therefore] the social policies which guide thejudges' choice are in a sense there for them to discover; the judges
are only "drawing out" of the [legal] rule what, if it is properly un-
derstood, is "latent" within it. 14
It is highly questionable that this is how the realists saw their disagree-
ment with positivism. When the realists criticized analytic jurisprudence's
focus on the separation of law and morals, it was not because the realists
thought that in adjudication judges "drew out" from precedent and stat-
utes conclusions that were "latent" within them. When Felix Cohen
called a judicial decision "a social event" he meant that the decision was
rooted in a broad set of conditions surrounding the case, including, but
not limited to, "human psychology, economics, and politics."'15 When
Karl Llewellyn emphasized shared practices among both judges and the
lay people affected by the law, he meant to include "mere" commercial
custom and local habit.' 6 When Jerome Frank emphasized the psycho-
logical sources of judicial decision, he drew attention to what was idiosyn-
cratic and subconscious within the judge's mind. 17 Despite their
differences, all the major realists shared a deep skepticism of the idea that
the source of decision, whatever it was, was in the law alone. The differ-
ences between realism and positivism were not over whether "social pol-
icy" was imminent in the law, but over whether the law, regardless of its
sources, could bind judicial decisionmaking at all.
In later writing Hart was much more clear about what compromised
the real dispute between positivism and realism.1 8 The section on realism
in Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals is much less clear
than, for example, Chapter 7 of The Concept of Law, in which Hart
clearly stated that the "rule-sceptic" believed that judges are not subject
to legal rules, in the sense that the rules bind decisionmaking. 19 So what
was Section III of Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals
about? If the realist did not think that judges are bound by the law "la-
tent" within every vague legal rule, who did? The answer, obviously, is
Lon Fuller. Section III of Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals is fascinating partly because of the way Hart converted his discus-
sion of realism into a discussion of Fuller's theory of the morality of law.
Fuller rejected positivism because he rejected its "fundamental postu-
late . . . that law must be strictly severed from morality. '20 Fuller as-
sumed Llewellyn's call for a "temporary" divorce of law and morals
14. Id.
15. Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM.
L. REV. 809, 843-44 (1935).
16. See Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 431, 445-46 (1930).
17. See JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 60 (3d ed. 1935).
18. See HART, supra note 3, at 124-41; H.L.A. Hart, American Jurisprudence Through
English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble Dream, in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRU-
DENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 123 (1983).
19. HART, supra note 3, at 138.
20. Fuller, supra note 5, at 656.
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placed realism and positivism in the same camp and treated the two theo-
ries interchangeably. 2' Fuller believed that law could not be separated
from morality because law, even "considered merely as order, con-
tains.., its own implicit morality. '2 2 Fuller thought that he was making a
conceptual argument that, in other contexts, was quite unremarkable.
We would agree, argued Fuller, that there are "natural laws" governing
"particular kind[s] of human undertaking[s]" such as carpentry. 23 In the
same way that there are natural laws governing good carpentry, there
must also be natural laws that govern "the enterprise of subjecting human
conduct to the governance of rules."'24
Fuller called the natural laws of governance of rules the "internal mo-
rality of law."' 25 The modifier "internal" was supposed to distinguish his
theory from the more demanding forms of natural law that used moral
philosophy to test the content of individual laws. 26 The internal morality
of law therefore placed a limit on how laws were made and applied, not
on what values they promoted.
What I have called the internal morality of law is in this sense a pro-
cedural version of natural law .... The term "procedural" is, how-
ever, broadly appropriate as indicating that we are concerned, not
with the substantive aims of legal rules, but with the ways in which a
system of rules for governing human conduct must be constructed
and administered if it is to be efficacious and at the same time re-
main what it purports to be. 27
The internal morality of law blended the perspective of both a legisla-
tor and a judge: it demanded that the lawmaker focus not only on the
substantive ends she wishes to achieve, but also on how those to whom
the law is directed will come to know what those ends are. For Fuller,
more traditional natural law theory had put the cart before the horse by
asking what the law should achieve before fully understanding how the
law was to achieve anything.
Fuller determined that the morality of law consisted of eight jointly
necessary conditions.28 These conditions represented the minimum floor
below which a legal system could not fall, as well as the heights to which a
21. See LON L. FULLER, THE LAW IN QUEST OF ITSELF 47 (1940).
22. Fuller, supra note 5, at 645.
23. LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 96 (1964).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. See id. at 104; Fuller, supra note 5, at 660; see also ROGER COTrERRELL, THE
POLITICS OF JURISPRUDENCE 130 (1989) (discussing Fuller's "distancing" himself from
classical natural law).
27. FULLER, supra note 23, at 97-97.
28. (1) a legal system must have rules, since a legal system cannot decide everything
on an "ad hoc" basis; (2) the rules must be publicized; (3) the rules may not be retroactive;
(4) the rules must be comprehensible; (5) the rules may not contradict other rules in the
same legal system; (6) the rules may not demand the impossible; (7) the rules may not be




legal system could aspire. 29 A legal system that consistently failed most of
the eight conditions simply had no law, while a legal system that satisfied
most of the conditions most of the time had law, albeit in varying
degrees. 30
It is important to recognize that for Fuller, the opposite of the internal
morality of law was a regime of "uncontrolled administrative discre-
tion. '31 Fuller phrased this contrast differently at different points in his
career, but the dichotomy always indicated the same stark choices: be-
tween reason and fiat,32 adjudication and arbitration 33 law and "manage-
rial direction. ' 34 In each of the second terms, the regime described is
one in which the relevant conduct is simply not governed by a norm. Yet
the demand that law be, if nothing else, a limit of a judge's scope of ac-
tion, the opposite of the realist's position, seemed to be something that
Fuller had in common with positivism, and this is exactly turned to this
feature of Fuller's argument in the middle of Section III of Positivism and
the Separation of Law and Morals. Without specifically referring to
Fuller (and, ostensibly, still discussing realism), Hart noted that just be-
cause a theory of law provided for a judge to decide according to "what
ought to be" in some cases, it did not follow that the theory endorsed "a
junction of law and morals. '35 Hart cautioned that "[w]e must, I think,
beware of thinking in a too simple-minded fashion about the word 'ought'
.... The word 'ought' merely reflects the presence of some standard of
criticism; one of these standards is a moral standard but not all standards
are moral."' 36 Thus, even if Fuller were correct about the internal struc-
ture of law, it simply was not clear what the morality of law, as defined by
Fuller, had to do with morality, and hence, why the truthfulness of moral-
ity of law proved that positivism was wrong. Hart argued that purposive
behavior, including behavior in conformity with a norm, was compatible
with evil ends. For example, he noted that there is no difference in the
use of "ought" in the statement "you ought not to lie" to one's children
and "you ought to have given her a second dose" to one's confederate in
crime. 37 In the legal context, Hart argued, all the morality of law required
29. According to Fuller, all normative conduct took place on a spectrum that fell be-
tween "morality of duty" (the minimum required of a normative system) and the "morality
of aspiration" (the end to which any normative system aspires). Id. at 5-10.
30. See id. at 39. The inner morality of law "confronts us with the problem of knowing
where to draw the boundary below which men will be condemned for failure, but can
expect no praise for success, and above which they will be admired for success and at worse
pitied for the lack of it." Id. at 42.
31. Fuller, supra note 5, at 654.
32. See Lon L. Fuller, Reason and Fiat in Case Law, 59 HARV. L. REV. 376, 377-78
(1946).
33. See Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353,
397 (1978).
34. FULLER, supra note 23, at 207.
35. Hart, supra note 1, at 612.
36. Hart, supra note 1, at 612-13.
37. Id. at 613. As Hart later argued, using the same example, "poisoning is no doubt a
purposive activity, and reflection on its purposes may show that it has its internal princi-
ples." H.L.A. Hart, The Morality of Law, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1286 (1965) (reviewing
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was that judicial decisions promote the purposes of the regime, not that
those purposes be morally justified.38 Hart was basically saying to Fuller:
"Positivism rejects legal power unconstrained by rules and so do you.
Why do you insist on saying that a regime of legal rules is necessarily
moral?"
Fuller felt quite strongly that there was a connection between the mo-
rality of law and substantive justice. 39  Much of his 1958 response to
Hart's Holmes Lecture was devoted to showing that the Nazis in fact did
not have a legal system. He argued, for example, that a German woman
who was prosecuted in 1949 for turning her husband in to the Nazi police
in 1944 in accord with anti-sedition laws passed in 1934 and 1938 (result-
ing in the husband's prosecution for the capital offense of slandering the
Ffihrer) was not acting under the valid law of the land when she turned
her husband in because the 1938 law was never law.4" Fuller subjected
the Nazi anti-sedition laws to the test of the morality of law and found
them wanting. The 1938 law, which forbade "publicly seek[ing] to injure
or destroy the will of the German people [in wartime]," failed, at a mini-
mum, the condition requiring that the administrator of the law follow the
rules he sets down because the husband had spoken against Hitler in pri-
vate with his wife, not in public. 4 1 The 1934 law, which forbade public or
private statements that "disclose a base disposition toward the leading
personalities of the nation or of the [Nazi] Party ... and of such a nature
as to undermine the people's confidence in their political leadership, shall
be punished by imprisonment," failed the morality of law because it was
so "overlarded and undermined ... by uncontrolled administrative dis-
cretion" that a judge would have no choice but "to declare this thing not
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964)). For example, one might command a poisoner in
one's service to "avoid poisons however lethal if their shape, color or size is likely to attract
notice." Id.
38. See Hart, supra note 1, at 613 ("Under the Nazi regime men were sentenced by
courts for criticisms of the regime. Here the choice of sentence might be guided exclu-
sively by consideration of what was needed to maintain the state's tyranny effectively.").
Ingo Muller has turned Fuller's position on its head and argued that the Nazi legal system
would have been less evil had it been more positivist. According to Miller, German juris-
prudence in the 1930s had adopted a view very similar to the theory of teleological reason-
ing demanded by Fuller's procedural natural law theory, that, when directed towards
substantively evil ends, allowed Nazi judges to achieve far more evil than had they been
acting like positivists. See INGO MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE: THE COURTS OF THE THIRD
REICH 220-22 (Deborah Lucas Schneider trans., 1991). One problem with Miller's argu-
ment is that he confuses classical legal positivism, which must include the separability the-
sis, the sources thesis, and the command theory, with a kind of judicial passivism, in which
the judge is constrained by both formalistic reasoning and a crabbed form of textualism.
See Markus Dick Dubber, Judicial Positivism and Hitler's Injustice, 93 COLUM. L. REV.
1807, 1820-21 (1993) (reviewing MULLER, HITLER'S JUSTICE).
39. See FULLER, supra note 23, at 153-55.
40. See Fuller, supra note 5, at 653-55 (discussing Judgment of July 27, 1949, Ober-
landesgericht Bamberg, 5 SODDEUTSCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 207 (Germany 1950)); Recent
Cases, 64 HARV. L. REV. 996, 1005 (1951).
41. Fuller, supra note 5, at 653-54 (citing section 5 of Kreigssonderstrafrecht Law of
Aug. 17, 1938, [19391 2 REICHSGESETZBLATr pt. I, at 1456).
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a law."' 42 Fuller offered other examples of Nazi "laws" that failed to
satisfy the morality of law, such as the "Roehm purge" in which the Nazis
tried, convicted, and then sentenced to death more than seventy party
members after they had been killed, 43 and the "laws" that forced Jewish
store owners to display signs saying "Jiidisches Gesch~ift" except in Berlin
during international events (when the Nazis wanted to appear more hu-
mane for foreign visitors). 44 According to Fuller, the Roehm purge law
failed to be "law" not because it was substantively horrific, but because it
was retroactive (condition three); similarly, the "Jiidisches Gesch~ift" law
failed because it was never publicly enacted (condition two). 45
Elsewhere, Fuller suggested that other evil legal systems, or at least the
substantively evil laws produced by those systems, would have failed to
reach the floor set out by the morality of law.46 However, classical legal
positivism did not deny that evil regimes often cut corners and aban-
doned the rule of law, or that evil regimes abandoned the rule of law
more often than good regimes. The separability thesis only claimed that
there was no necessary relationship between substantively evil regimes
and the presence or absence of the rule of law. For example, one might
argue that post-war South Africa posed exactly this dilemma. Through-
out the 1950s and 1960s, South Africa erected an evil, racist regime that,
arguably, did satisfy the eight conditions of the morality of law. Fuller
responded by noting that even South African law was infected by proce-
dural immorality in that in its zeal to regulate the races according to the
rule of law, the South African government created a set of rules that de-
generated through their own complexity into a set of managerial dictates
no less arbitrary than the Nazi anti-sedition laws.47
For Fuller, the fact that every modern regime that attempted to achieve
substantively evil aims failed to conform to the morality of law evidenced
a necessary relationship between substantive justice and procedural jus-
tice. 48 Fuller argued that the reason why evil regimes like Nazi Germany,
Stalinist Russia, and South Africa could never, in principle, have law, is
because "coherence and goodness have more affinity than coherence and
42. Id. at 654-55 (citing Article 11 of A Law Against Malicious Attacks on the State
and the Party and for the Protection of the Party Uniform, Law of Dec. 20, 1934, [1934] 1
REICHSGESETZBLATr 1269). Fuller highlighted the facts that, unlike the 1938 law, this law
set out only imprisonment as punishment for its violation, and that the definition of a
"leading personality" was left open to interpretation by the National Minister of Justice.
43. See id. at 650 (citing N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1934, p. 3, col. 3 & July 14, 1934, p. 5, col.2).
44. See FULLER, supra note 23, at 158.
45. See Fuller, supra note 5, at 650; FULLER, supra note 23, at 158.
46. See FULLER, supra note 23, at 160-61, 202. Fuller suggested that the Soviet's retro-
active imposition of the death penalty for violations of currency regulations violated the
morality of law, as did South Africa's racial classification laws, which relied on the unbri-
dled discretion of the courts. See id.
47. See id. at 160. Fuller thought that the view that South Africa was a combination of
"strict observance of legality" with "a body of law that is brutal and inhuman" arose from a
confusion "between deference for constituted authority and fidelity to law." Id.




[The positivist] seems to assume that evil aims may have as much
coherence and inner logic as good ones. I, for one, refuse to accept
that assumption .... I [therefore] believe that when men are com-
pelled to explain and justify their decisions, the effect will generally
be to pull those decisions toward goodness, by whatever standards of
ultimate goodness there are.5u1
The connection, therefore, between the retroactivity condition of the
morality of law and justice is that if the Nazi or Soviet lawmakers had
been forced to frame in advance the general norm that governed the Ro-
ehm purge or the imposition of the death penalty for currency offenses,
they would have, like Fuller's failed imaginary sovereign Rex, failed to
make law and would have been forced to fall back on issuing managerial
directives, not norms. 5' Furthermore, the demand of prospectivity, like
the demand of publicity, forces the lawmakers to confront the substantive
evilness of the ends served by the state's power. It is a natural reaction
on the part of lawmakers, when confronted by the ugliness of their own
handiwork, to try to hide their evil from others through secret laws and
from themselves through retroactive laws (which legitimate, after the
fact, acts that are often the result of inchoate, hidden passions such as
cruelty, racism, or greed). 52
Fuller's assumption that justice was more "coherent" than evil was the
keystone to his attack on positivism. If the coherence thesis, as we may
call it, is not true, then Fuller's theory about the morality of law could be
absolutely true and yet entail nothing about positivism. Fuller admitted
that he had not proven the coherence thesis, and it is obvious that it is a
controversial claim that touches on some of the most difficult problems of
moral philosophy. 53 Although the coherence thesis might have been sup-
portable if one stayed at the level of crude historical generalization, it
seemed to miss the point about what made certain uses of state power
immoral. For example, Fuller argued that what made the laws ordering
the extermination of Jews in concentration camps a violation of natural
law was that they were passed in secret thus violating condition two of the
morality of law.54 But of course, Germany's actions would have been no
less immoral had it chosen to exterminate the Jews after a long, public
debate. The coherence thesis notwithstanding, it is not obvious that Ger-
49. Fuller, supra note 5, at 636.
50. Id.
51. See FULLER, supra note 23, at 40-41.
52. See Fuller, supra note 5, at 652 ("But as with retroactivity, what in most societies is
kept under control by the tacit restraints of legal decency broke out in monstrous form
under Hitler. Indeed, so loose was the whole Nazi morality of law that it is not easy to
know just what should be regarded as an unpublished or secret law.").
53. See id. at 636; see also CO'ITERRELL, supra note 26, at 132; Anthony D'Amato, Lon
Fuller and Substantive Natural Law, 26 AM. J. JURIS. 202 (1981).
54. See Fuller, supra note 5, at 651 (citing Gustav Radbruch, Die Erneuerung des
Rechts, 2 DIE WANDLUNG 8, 9 (Germany 1947)). Of the secret laws ordering the Holo-




many would have retreated from the Holocaust had they been forced to
engage in open and prospective lawmaking. Would the evil goals of the
anti-sedition laws discussed above have been less achievable had they
been written in conformity with the morality of law? According to Fuller,
the 1938 law failed to be law because it did not explicitly forbid private
slanders against the state. 55 Would the law have become more palatable
had it been amended to take into account private statements? According
to Fuller, the 1934 law failed because it delegated too much discretion to
the Ministry of Justice in the definition of its scope of application.56 If the
problem therefore was that it was void for vagueness, it is not clear that
the law really was infirm; the 1934 law did not look that different from
certain American loyalty statutes such as the Alien and Sedition Acts and
the Espionage Act during World War 1. 57 As David Luban has pointed
out, what made the Nazi anti-sedition laws "bad" laws was that they vio-
lated substantive moral principles, either because they were designed to
defend an evil state, or, more controversially, because any law designed
to limit dissent regardless of the moral status of the state is evil, but the
Nazi laws were "law" just as much as America's (arguably evil) anti-sedi-
tion laws were law.5 8
II.
Hart's detour from his discussion of realism in Section III of Positivism
and the Separation of Law and Morals was designed to show Fuller that
the coherence thesis was wrong. But of what relevance was the coher-
ence thesis to the realist's critique of positivism? Hart's argument that
there is no relationship between the coherence of a set of legal rules and
their moral content is simply unrelated to the realist claim that legal rules
are never sufficient grounds for judicial decision making. Apparently,
Hart thought that the positivist separation of law and morality (the rejec-
tion of the coherence thesis) was a precondition of the very idea of legal
rules (the rejection of rule-scepticism). At the end of Section III, after he
demolished the coherence thesis, Hart said, "We can now return to the
main point"-the defense of positivism against realism.59 What the real-
ists and Fuller share, said Hart, is the view that the positivist's error was
to insist on the separation of law "as it is and as it ought to be."' 60 The
rejection of the separation of law and morality resulted in "all questions
being open to reconsideration. '61 It is interesting to note that Section III,
55. See id. at 653-54.
56. See id. at 654.
57. See NORMAN DORSEN ET. AL., 1 POLITICAL AND CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED
STATES 35-39 (3d ed. 1967) (citing The Alien and Sedition Acts, June and July 1798). For a
discussion of the Espionage Act, see David Luban, A Report on the Legality of Evil: The
Case of the Nazi Judges, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 1121, 1145-46 (1995) (citing ZECHARIAH
CHAFEE, JR., FREEDOM OF SPEECH 57-58 (1920)).
58. See Luban, supra note 57, at 1146.
59. Hart, supra note 1, at 614.




which began with Hart reminding his audience that Austin praised judi-
cial legislation, ended with the claim that only positivism can keep judges
from illegitimately revising the law. Hart obviously thought that there
was something in Fuller's natural law theory that supported the realist's
rule-scepticism. To see why he thought that, we will have to look at how
he understood legal rules.
At the beginning of Section I1, Hart argued that the reason why any
legal rule (such as Rule P) was irreducibly vague was that every rule has a
set of standard instances "in which no doubts are felt about its applica-
tion" 62 and a set of "debatable" cases that "are neither obviously applica-
ble nor obviously ruled out."' 63 The former cases lie at the "core" of the
rule, while the latter cases lie at their "penumbra." 64 When the rule is
applied to a core instance, it is not vague, and when it is applied to a
penumbral instance, it is vague with regard to that instance. The rest of
Hart's defense of positivism against its realist critics followed from the
core/penumbra distinction: when a legal rule is applied in a penumbral
case, the law-applier must use a non-legal reason to determine how to
apply the rule; that is why Austin could both see law as a system of legal
rules and envision judicial legislation.
Hart's disagreement with realism was based on his disagreement over
the proper way to think of the non-legal reason used by the law-applier in
a penumbral case. The non-legal reason had to be "sound or rational" (it
could not be the flip of a coin); it very likely would refer to social policy
or morality. 65 There is a loose sense in which the reason used by the law-
applier to settle a penumbral case reflects the law-applier's view of what
the "law ought to be." After all, why would the law-applier have chosen
it if he or she didn't believe that the law "ought" to reflect that reason?
Thus, it is possible that in the case of Rule P, a judge who refuses to
prohibit bicycles from the park reveals, in effect, that she does not think
that the state "ought" to exclude bicycles from the park. But, says Hart,
the non-legal reason the judge has for settling a penumbral instance of a
rule is not part of the law. While it would be correct to say that the non-
legal reason had an effect on the law (there is now a "precedent" that
renders Rule P less penumbral and more core-like), the legal effect is part
of the law, but the non-legal reason that produced it is not. Hart saw a
great threat to legal rules from the idea that there was no difference be-
tween a reason for action in a penumbral case and a core case, stating
that "if there are borderlines, there must first be lines."'66 The experience
of the penumbral case is a reality, Hart seemed to be saying, and if it is a
reality, then the difference between core and penumbra must be a reality
also.
62. Id. at 607.
63. Id.
64. See id.
65. See id. at 608.
66. Id. at 614.
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The significance of declaring all the non-legal reasons for filling in the
penumbral cases part of "the law" seems at best semantic; the difference
between a legal and non-legal reason would disappear and the set of legal
rules would expand to include virtually all social norms. That does not
entail either the realist's rule-scepticism or Fuller's natural law. Ex-
panding the set of rules governing judges does not prevent those rules
from constraining judicial decision, nor does it imply that all of those
rules must necessarily correspond with morality. It was not the expansion
of legal rules that concerned Hart; it was the mixing of legal reasons with
reasons from policy and morality that concerned him. According to the
core/penumbra distinction, a judge could appeal to a reason from policy
or morality because there was no legal reason that could solve the ques-
tion of penumbral application. The non-legal reasons did not compete
with the legal reason, nor were they balanced against it. The difference
between the core and penumbra was the type of reasons that counted in
each category. The sort of reasons that governed decision making in the
core were different in kind from the reasons permitted in the penumbra,
and Hart feared that if the word "law" were applied to both sorts of rea-
sons, the core would disappear and soon all legal reasons for action would
be reduced to reasons of either social policy or morality. As Gordon
Baker has said, one of the central elements of Hart's theory of law was
that "legal concepts and legal statements are sui generis; i.e., that they
cannot be shown to be logically equivalent to non-legal concepts and non-
legal statements. '67
The reason for Hart's concern was best illustrated by Fuller's argument
for the morality of law. For Fuller there was no reason to distinguish
between the core and penumbra because all legal rules have to be inter-
preted according to their "purpose. ' 68 But if the coherence thesis is cor-
rect, purpose referred not merely to the subjective intentions of the
author of a statute, or even its conventionally held meanings, but its con-
formity with the morality of law. Recall that for Fuller, it was part of the
very definition of law that it be directed towards some practical effect,
and as we saw above, law that fails to strive towards the good tends to-
ward incoherence, contradiction, and failure. If the purpose of law is to
subject "human conduct to the guidance and control of general rules,"
then law cannot be just a "datum of nature" because the very idea of
"guidance" presupposes a teleology or morality.69 A sincere Fullerian
interpreter would therefore attempt, like a good Dworkinian, to make
the law the best it can be.70 This means that the right way to interpret
67. G.P. Baker, Defeasibility and Meaning, in LAW, MORALITY, AND SOCIETY: ESSAYS
IN HONOUR OF H.L.A. HART 26 (P.M.S. Hacker & J. Raz eds., 1977).
68. See Fuller, supra note 5, at 662.
69. FULLER, supra note 23, at 146; see also Lon L. Fuller, Human Purpose and Natural
Law, 53 J. PHIL. 697 (1956).




Rule P is to ask "which application brings this law closer to the legal
system's internal morality of law?" It is possible that the system's inter-
nal morality of law may be indifferent to the question of bicycles in parks,
but no judge would know that until he or she asked the question.7
Therefore, all the conventional tools of statutory interpretation, such as
inquiries into legislative intent, plain meaning, and precedent, must play
an instrumental and hence secondary role to the legal system's ultimate
value-the good.
In the case of common law, the Fullerian approach has a similar task
when it approaches a question of doctrine. Do bystanders have a right to
recover for emotional distress? Here too, the law-applier must construct
a "purpose" for tort law that is based, ultimately, on the internal morality
of law. At times Fuller suggested that the internal morality of a legal
system could be indifferent to the distribution and definition of rights in
civil actions, but this is not an obvious implication that we can draw from
his theory.72 Just as with Rule P, a judge must first test the application of
any legal rule against the morality of law before he or she could know
that justice is indifferent between two doctrinal alternatives. Even this
answer, neutrality, must come from what is required by "the good." As
in the case of statutory interpretation, all other "legal" doctrines, includ-
ing precedent, serve an instrumental role and must be trumped, when
necessary, by the ultimate fact that evil aims may have "as much coher-
ence and inner logic as good ones."'73
The realist, unlike Fuller, did not believe in the coherence thesis, but
believed in its inverse: if social policy were incorporated into the rule
governing judicial decisionmaking, then there could be no legal rules,
since social policy reflected diverse and incompatible interests. Judicial
decisionmaking was a product of "rules," to the extent that each judge's
subjective commitment to social policy (however defined) formed a pat-
tern of outcomes. 74 As with natural law, the introduction of the non-legal
reason for the application of a penumbral case destroyed the separation
between core and penumbra. The realists reflected on the fact that legal
rules cannot govern decisionmaking in the penumbra and then denied
71. See Larry Alexander & Ken Kress, Against Legal Principles, in LAW AND INTER-
PRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 295 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) (arguing that
once a legal principle is selected as the ground of decision, that principle will determine its
own application (or nonapplication)).
72. See ROBERT S. SUMMERS, LON L. FULLER 74-78 (1984) (explaining that it is a
mistake to assume that Fuller's views on civil adjudication were mostly process-oriented).
73. Fuller, supra note 5, at 636.
74. Hart reproduced this quote from Llewellyn: "rules ... are important so far as they
help you ... predict what judges will do ... That is all their importance, except as pretty
playthings." Hart, supra note 1, at 615 (quoting K.N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH:
ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 3, 5 (1st ed., 1930)). Brian Leiter has recently argued that
Llewellyn's "sociological" realism was "naturalistic" and nonsceptical, in that it endeav-
ored to reduce jurisprudence into a branch of the natural sciences that can predict out-
comes with tolerable accuracy. See Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: Toward a
Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 283-86 (1997).
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that "there are, or can be, any rules."'75 The realist came to this conclu-
sion, Hart pointed out in The Concept of Law, because like the natural
lawyer, he believed that if a rule existed it would govern practical action
in all circumstances. Whereas Fuller was an "absolutist" when it came to
practical reasoning (every judicial decision has to be tested against the
morality of law), the realist was a "disappointed absolutist" who agreed
with Fuller on what it meant to reason according to rule, but did not think
that there were any rules, at least in law.76 The realist argued that, since
the basis for judicial decision in the penumbra was not legal rules but
social policy, and social policy was part of the law, the basis for judicial
decision in the core was no different than the basis for decision in the
penumbra.77 It is because of arguments like this that Hart became wary
of agreeing that "social policy" was part of the set of legal reasons that
governed judicial decisionmaking.
So Hart saw a very close connection between the coherence thesis (or
its inverse, disappointed absolutism) and his argument for the core/pe-
numbra distinction.78 The question that I want to consider next is
whether his linkage of the two can be defended. For purposes of this
discussion, I want to focus on the coherence thesis, where I am more
confident of my ability to show that a rejection of the coherence thesis
implies an embrace of Hart's theory of rules. First we should understand
what the coherence thesis stands for. It stands not just for the view that
only a morally defensible set of legal rules can be coherent. Although that
is what Fuller ultimately tried to argue, his specific conclusion reveals a
deeper and broader claim about law: that whatever the ultimate end of a
legal system, every rule within the system must be applied based on an
interpretation that instantiates that end. Let us call this the "monist" ap-
proach to legal decisionmaking. 79 A Nazi judge could be a monist just as
75. HART, supra note 3, at 139.
76. See id.
77. This is a summary of Hart's understanding of the realist position, and Hart was
only partially correct. Certainly some realists, such as Jerome Frank, did not think that
social policy necessarily played a major role in legal judgment. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK,
LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (6th ed. 1948).
78. Baker noted that Hart tried to steer a "middle way between realism and reduction-
ism." Baker, supra note 67, at 27. 1 would put it differently: Hart tried to steer a middle
course between two types of reductionist theory, realism and natural law. It is important
to note that Baker called American Realism a reductionist theory. Baker was correct to
call realism a reductionist theory, in that it "reduced" the type of reasons that jurispru-
dence recognizes by replacing legal reasons with reasons of social policy. From this per-
spective, Baker's statement about the goals of Hart's theory supports my argument. Hart
believed in "the possibility of non-trivial explanation of all legal concepts and the distinc-
tive irreducible character of these concepts." Id.
79. Monism is a form of practical reasoning that can apply to any field of decisionmak-
ing. A good example of monism is act-utilitarianism, which is monistic because ultimately
every choice by the act-utilitarian should be evaluated according to the degree that it maxi-
mizes utility. See, e.g., J.J.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in UTILI-
TARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST 9 (J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams eds., 1973). See also
DAVID LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM 134-36 (1965). 1 discuss monism in




much as a natural lawyer: both would demand that judicial decisions in-
stantiate their respective "summum bonae."80
Monism requires a certain view about rules: that every act of rule-fol-
lowing is an interpretation of the rule. This is easy to see in the case of
Fuller. In Positivism and Fidelity to Law, Fuller argued against Hart's
theory of legal rules by proposing three counterexamples~1 The first was
a variation on Rule P: what if some local patriots wanted to erect a fully
operational truck on a pedestal in the park to honor those who died in
World War II?82 The second hypothesized a statute that made it a misde-
meanor "to sleep in any railway station," and a situation in which two
men were arrested at 3 AM: an "orderly" man who had dozed off while
waiting for a delayed train, and a man who "had brought a blanket and
pillow . . . and had obviously settled . . . down for the night" but was
arrested before he fell asleep.8 3 The third was a fragment of a sentence
that read: "All improvements must be promptly reported to ... " which
then had to be given meaning. 84 In each of these cases, argued Fuller, the
solution for the judicial-decisionmaker charged with applying these three
"rules" was to develop a theory of the purpose of the rule. According to
Fuller, we must ask ourselves, "What can this rule be for? What evil does
it seek to avert? What good is it intended to promote?" 85 Only by know-
ing the purpose of the rule can we understand what it means in any par-
ticular instance. The three examples are designed to demonstrate the
need for such a theory. In the first we have a case which is clearly a
standard instance of the prohibition, and yet we know the law does not
prohibit it. In the second we have two cases which present different ver-
sions of the standard instance of the law. In the third we have a case
where the rule is vague, not because it applies to a penumbral case, but
because it is missing a word. All these problems become tractable, ar-
gued Fuller, once we know the "purpose" and "structure" of the rule.86
Because each rule sits within a network of rules (the legal system as a
whole), each rule has a place within that network.8 7 In the counterexam-
pies, the vagueness in each rule could be dispelled through the applica-
tion of each rule against "hypothetical cases":
By pulling our minds first in one direction, then in another, these
cases help us to understand the fabric of thought before us. This
fabric is something we seek to discern, so that we may know truly
what it is, but it is also something that we inevitably help to create as
we strive (in accordance with our obligation of fidelity to law) to
80. "The summum bonum view asks us to take notice of the fact that from the per-
spective of practical reasoning, every [legal system] is designed to achieve [an ultimate]
good." Sebok, supra note 79, at 432.
81. Fuller, supra note 5, at 663-65.
82. See id. at 663.
83. Id. at 664.
84. Id. at 664-65.
85. Id. at 665.
86. See id. at 669.
87. See id. at 667.
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make the statute a coherent, workable whole.88
As Fuller himself admitted, the activity of developing an account of the
purpose of a rule is an interpretive activity: one "inevitably creates" as
one "make[s] the statute part of a coherent, workable whole."' 89 A mo-
nistic view of law relies on the claim that every rule must be interpreted
because without the opportunity to interpret in every instance of its appli-
cation, the law could not be rendered coherent. According to Fuller,
every rule has at least two possible applications, and one of those applica-
tions is always "more" coherent than the other.911 The act of interpreta-
tion involves the adoption of one application over at least one other.
Monism needs a mechanism through which the coherence of law can be
(potentially) achieved, and the view that every law must be interpreted-
that in every act of judicial decision-making there is the opportunity to
select between at least two applications-provides that mechanism.
Fuller's argument-that in order to apply a law one must know its
"purpose"-really means that in order to apply a law one must interpret
it in accordance with a theory that fits it into a single, coherent set of
norms. That is why, at times, Fuller seemed less interested in authorial
intent than one might expect, and why he insisted that "structure" can
sometimes be as important in applying a rule as purpose.9t In Fuller's
theory, "purpose" was used in a very special way; it described the theory
that would explain or justify the act of interpretation by a law-applier.
The argument for the coherence thesis is therefore rooted in the claim
that every application of a law is an act of interpretation. The demand
that law incorporate non-legal reasons would be greatly strengthened if it
were the case that every legal rule had to be interpreted, because, if the
coherence thesis was correct, the ultimate ground for choosing between
applications of a legal rule would have to be a reason that could be coher-
ent within a single, morally defensible scheme of practical reason.92
88. Id.; see also SUMMERS, supra note 72, at 127 (discussing Fuller's use of hypothetical
cases to test and establish purpose).
89. Fuller entitled Section VII of Positivism and Fidelity to Law, "The Problem of
Interpretation: The Core and the Penumbra" and throughout the section refers to his dis-
pute with Hart as a dispute over the nature of legal interpretation. See Fuller, supra note 5,
at 661-69. The parallels with Dworkin's theory of "constructive interpretation" are obvi-
ous. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 5, at 245 ("Law as integrity, then, requires a judge to
test his interpretation of any part of the great network of political structures and decisions
of his community by asking whether [or not] it could form part of a coherent theory justify-
ing the network as a whole.").
90. See Fuller, supra note 5, at 662-63.
91. See SUMMERS, supra note 72, at 120-21.
92. Conversely, if the realists were correct and the coherence thesis was a correct ac-
count of rules, but unachievable, then rule-skepticism would be the appropriate response
since the application of every legal rule would still be a matter of choice between alterna-
tives in which no rule governed the choice (although any one choice might be both subjec-




As noted above, Fuller assumed that Hart's core/penumbra approach
was a theory of the interpretation of legal rules. Fuller assumed too
much. Hart used the word "interpretation" only with regard to the pe-
numbra, not the core. 93 Hart was very clear that a core case was an "in-
stance in which no doubts are felt about its application. ' 94 In The
Concept of Law, Hart described "plain" cases as those that do not need
interpretation because the recognition of what to do is "unproblematic or
'automatic."'' 95 One might be tempted to think that what made a "core"
or "plain" case "easy" was that it more clearly fit into the coherent
scheme of the legal system's values than a "hard" case, so judgement be-
tween available options just seemed automatic. But Hart clearly rejected
that approach in The Concept of Law, stating that the only difference
between a core and penumbral case is that the former is "familiar" and
has been learned as a result of recurring experience. 96 Hart's rejection of
the idea that law application in the core was interpretive, coupled with his
references to Wittgenstein, reveal the central role that the concept of "os-
tensive" definition played in his theory.9 7 When we teach another person
by ostensive definition, we teach by example; understanding is ultimately
measured by whether or not the student manifests understanding in the
appropriate way.98 One teaches a student through ostensive definition by
way of concrete example and correction. "There is no mysterious some-
thing more that he must grasp, after he has understood all of this ...
93. In Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, Hart first uses the term "in-
terpretation" in the context of McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931), where he
criticized Justice Holmes for failing to see that the case presented a penumbral instance of
the statute in question ("He either does not see or pretends not to see that the general
terms of this rule are susceptible of different interpretations .... "). Hart, supra note 1, at
610.
94. Id. at 607.
95. HART, supra note 3, at 126.
96. Id. The metaphor core/penumbra is misleading because it suggests that the appli-
cations of a legal rule can be mapped onto a single metric, and that there must be at least
one quality that all correct applications of the rule possess. There is no reason to believe
that Hart viewed rules this way, and some reason to believe that he accepted Wittgen-
stein's concept of "family resemblances." See LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL
INVESTIGATIONS § 67 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 2d ed. 1958), cited in Hart, supra note 1,
at 628. The concept of family resemblance is compatible with Hart's view that the core is
comprised of standard instances of the application of a rule: "Although no single defining
feature shared by all the standard examples tin the core] can be specified ... this does not
mean that they are not standard examples." ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND
LEGAL THEORY 133 (1992).
97. See HART, supra note 3, at 297 (citing WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 96, §§ 208-38);
see also WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 96, § 6 (on "ostensive teaching of words").
98. See WiTGENSTEIN, supra note 96, § 210.
But do you really explain to the other person what you yourself understand?
Don't you get him to guess the essential thing? You give him examples,-but
he has to guess their drift, to guess your intention."-Every explanation
which I can give myself I give to him too.-"He guesses what I intend" would
mean: various interpretations of my explanation come to his mind, and he




There is nothing that I 'grasp' in my understanding of 'red' . . . which
somehow transcends the concrete contextual examples and explanations
of the concept in use and cannot be captured by them." 99
Wittgenstein believed that when we make an intelligible statement in a
language, there is no abstract or "superlative fact" that can govern the
formation of the statement other than the language in which the state-
ment is made."' There can be no "theory" behind a rule other than the
practice that made the rule comprehensible to start with: "nothing...
keeps our practices in line except the reactions and responses we learn in
learning them."""' If asked by Fuller why a core instance was a correct
application of the Rule P, ultimately, for Hart, this question makes as
much sense as if Fuller had pointed to a patch of red and asked "why"
Hart had called it red. 1° 2
Thus, in the core, there is no interpretation, although different people
may apply the same rule differently. Fuller thought that every act of rule
application was an act of interpretation because he believed that every
rule is open to at least two applications; one needed an interpretive the-
ory to know "how to go on." Fuller used interpretation to escape a para-
dox that Wittgenstein had identified in his critique of traditional views
about rules. Wittgenstein argued that it is impossible to explain a rule by
reference to concepts that transcend our experience of the rule itself.
Our application of a rule cannot be explained by reference to a concept
revealed by our experience of the rule because there is (in theory) an
infinite set of hypotheses that are compatible with our empirical experi-
ence of the rule. As Wittgenstein famously argued, any mathematical se-
quence is theoretically compatible with an infinite number of equations:
for example, the sequence 2, 4, 6, 8 .... might represent the rule "[a]dd
2," or it might represent the rule "[a]dd 2 up to 1000, 4 up to 2000, 6 up to
3000 and so on."' 1 3 The "paradox" that interested Wittgenstein was that
the view that a rule was an abstraction revealed by or contained in a set
of empirically observable facts led to the skeptical conclusion that rules
did not exist. "This was our paradox: no course of action could be deter-
mined by a rule, because every course of action can be made out to ac-
cord with the rule." ° 4 There were at least three directions one could
take in response to this paradox.
The first was to embrace scepticism, which is what Saul Kripke has rec-
99. Gene Anne Smith, Wittgenstein and the Sceptical Fallacy, in WITFGENSTEIN AND
LEGAL THEORY 167 (Dennis M. Patterson ed., 1992); see also W.V. QUINE & J.S. ULLIAN,
THE WEB OF BELIEF 24 (2d ed. 1970).
100. See WITGENSTEIN, supra note 96, at § 192; see also G.P. BAKER & P.M.S.
HACKER, WiTrGENSTEIN: RULES, GRAMMAR AND NECEssrIY 171-72 (1985) ("The pivotal
point in Wittgenstein's remarks on following rules is that a rule is internally related to acts
which accord with it. The rule and nothing but the rule determines what is correct.").
101. John McDowell, Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following, in WF-rGENSTEIN: To FOL-
LOW A RULE 149 (Stephen H. Holtzman & Christopher M. Leich eds., 1981).
102. See MARMOR, supra note 96, at 128.
103. WIrTENGENSTEIN, supra note 96, § 185.
104. Id. § 201.
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ommended, and many legal scholars have followed his lead.10 5 The sec-
ond path was to insist, as Fuller did, that there is a transcendental scheme
of norms and that the meaning of a rule is determined by its place in that
scheme.116 The third path was to reject both scepticism and idealism,
which is what Wittgenstein did, and to argue that rules could have mean-
ing and could guide their own application, but that the rule application
was a practice or a way of life, not an interpretation of another abstract
entity.
As we saw above, Fuller opted for the second option: the task of the
rule-applier was to determine the abstraction represented by previous ap-
plications of the rule; this is what Fuller called interpretation. But ac-
cording to Wittgenstein, interpretation could not lead one out of the
paradox: an interpretation of a rule could not tell you "how to go on" if
the rule itself could not tell you "how to go on." Reliance on interpreta-
tion alone will never provide closure in the penumbra:
[The problem with interpretation] can be seen.., from the mere fact
that in the course of our argument we give one interpretation after
another; as if each one contented us at least for a moment, until we
thought of yet another standing behind it. What this shews is that
there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but
which is exhibited in what we call "obeying the rule" and "going
against it" in actual cases.
Hence there is an inclination to say: every action according to the
rule is an interpretation. But we ought to restrict the term "interpre-
tation" to the substitution of one expression of the rule for
another.107
According to Wittgenstein, meaning is communicated by action,
whether this action is by example, correction, or other social practices. If
the meaning of a rule cannot be communicated by the way the rule is
105. Kripke has argued that Wittgenstein may not have realized the skeptical reach of
the paradox presented in The Philosophical Investigations. According to Kripke, what
Wittgenstein really proved was that there is no rule at all when we attempt to determine
the meaning of a set of empirical facts, such as a set of numbers; that is to say, there is not
"fact of the matter" to answer the question "how do I go on." The answer to that question
is indeterminate, and may be fixed by factors such as community consensus, but not by the
rule itself. See SAUL A. KRIPKE, WITTGENSTEIN ON RULES AND PRIVATE LANGUAGE 7-10
(1982). As Brian Bix has pointed out, Kripke's interpretation has been strongly criticized
by many philosophers, including Peter Hacker, Gordon Baker, David Pears, John McDow-
ell, and Simon Blackburn. See BRIAN Bix, LAW, LANGUAGE AND LEGAL DETERMINACY
38 (1993). Nonetheless, some legal academics have been drawn to Kripke's approach. See,
e.g., Charles M. Yablon, Law and Metaphysics, 96 YALE L.J. 613 (1986) (book review); see
also Radin, supra note 5, at 781 (1983). Others have read Wittgenstein as a skeptic without
necessarily relying on Kripke. See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A
Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781 (1982). For an
approach sympathetic to Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein that rejects rule-skepticism, see
Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, 142 U. PA. L.
REV. 549, 570-72 (1993) (even if Kripke's reading of Wittgenstein is right, "the practice of
rule-following-by judges or anyone else-remains intact.").
106. See Christian Zapf & Eben Moglen, Linguistic Indeterminacy and the Rule of Law:
On the Perils of Misunderstanding Wittgenstein, 84 GEO. L.J. 485, 489-91 (1995).
107. WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 96, § 201.
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used, there is no reason to believe that a theory about the rule can com-
municate the rule. Interpretation "cannot bridge the gap between rule
and action. A rule, in other words, is a sign and its meaning cannot be
determined by another sign." 10(I Another way of putting this argument is
that the move to interpretation must fail because it opens up the problem
of infinite regress.1 09 Hart recognized this problem: "Canons of 'interpre-
tation' cannot eliminate, though they can diminish, these uncertainties [of
meaning]; for these canons are themselves general rules for the use of
language, and make use of general terms which themselves require
interpretation."' 10
A Fullerian might object that if the meaning of a rule is grounded in its
use, we never can know if we have complete knowledge of the rule (or if
we "really" know it) because time and events might confront us with a
choice of applications that leaves us not knowing how to go on. This
objection shows that the Fullerian is still viewing a rule as something sep-
arate from an actual practice. The only question we can ask of a rule, said
Wittgenstein, is whether it guides action in concrete circumstances: "[t]he
sign-post is in order-if, under normal circumstances, it fulfills its pur-
pose.""' We can only ask that question from within our current practice
because it is only within an existing practice that a rule can exist. The
application of a rule is not, as Fuller would have it, a theoretical question:
How is the application of a rule fixed? Do you mean 'logically'
fixed? Either by means of further rules, or not at all! - Or do you
mean; how is it that we agree in applying it thus and not otherwise?
Through training drill and the forms of our life. This is a matter not
of a consensus of opinions but of forms of life.' 12
Whether one is obeying a rule is a matter of fact determined by the
grammar of the rule. It is not a matter of one's interpretation of one's
actions; one cannot obey a rule "privately."'1 13 The fact that humans share
a language presupposes the existence of the correct application of a
rule. 1 4 A language game does not enable me to verify my interpretation
of the world; "[iut is required to give the context in which I can make
meaningful judgments at all." 115 Therefore, a rule can only be true (or
108. MARMOR, supra note 96, at 149; see also Smith, supra note 99, at 174.
109. See Smith, supra note 99, at 172 (Wittgenstein "sought to show that all comprehen-
sion could not be ultimately a matter of 'interpretation' ... for we would then be led to an
infinite regress of interpretations"); see also DENNIS PA'rERSON, LAW AND TRUTH 88
(1996) ("If all understanding were interpretation, then each interpretation would itself
stand in need of interpretation, and so on, infinitely regressing to infinity.").
110. HART, supra note 3, at 126.
111. WITrOENSTEIN, supra note 96, § 87.
112. BAKER & HACKER, supra note 100, at 258 (quoting Ludwig Wittgenstein, MS 160,
51 (unpublished manuscript)).
113. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 96, § 202 ("'[O]beying a rule' is a practice. And to
think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule
'privately."').
114. See id. § 242 ("If language is to be a means of communication there must be agree-
ment not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments").
115. Smith, supra note 99, at 179; see also WiTrOENSTEIN, supra note 96, § 241 ("'So
you are saying that human agreement decides what is true and what is false?'-lt is what
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have "correct applications") to the extent that the form of life in which I
operate permits. Does that mean that some rules may be "incomplete" in
the sense that they may not clearly provide applications to all possible
instances? Absolutely. But Wittgenstein argued that it was foolish to say
that we cannot know something until we have banished from our minds
the possibility of doubt. 1 6 Here too, all we can do is test our judgment
within the practice in which we live, and all we can ask of a theory is that
it function within that practice: "One might say: an explanation serves to
remove or to avert a misunderstanding-one, that is, that would occur
but for the explanation; not every one I can imagine." ' 1 7 We completely
understand a rule if we currently understand what it requires of us now;
the fact that it might not provide an answer under all circumstances is not
proof that it is not complete. For the monist, we need to know a rule's
purpose in order to be able to know (in theory, at least) all of the rule's
actual and possible applications. But this demand that we must under-
stand a rule's purpose in order to apply a rule is simply nonsense from the
Wittgensteinian perspective." 18
Hart adopted the Wittgensteinian idea that all rules are silent with re-
gard to some possible set of applications. The core applications were the
equivalent of the "standard instances," which Wittgenstein thought
proved that the language user knew how to use the rule. Just as with
other language games, a law-applier who got enough of the standard in-
stances wrong would be judged not to know the rule she was using. An
inability to apply the rule in all conceivable situations proved neither that
the rule was not complete nor that its applier did not know how to use it;
it proved nothing more than there was vagueness in the rule. 1 9 The rule
was not vague; it just could not settle disagreements over all its applica-
tions. This is what it meant to say that the rule has "open texture.'
120
Friedrich Waismann used open texture to describe the phenomenon that
no proposition can anticipate all circumstances upon which it is to apply;
although a term like gold was not vague, it was "of an open texture in
that we can never fill up all the possible gaps through which doubt may
seep in."'121 In other words, some set of events may come to pass in
human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is
not agreement in opinions but in form of life.").
116. See WirrGENSTEIN, supra note 96, § 84 ("But that is not to say that we are in
doubt because it is possible for us to imagine a doubt.").
117. Id. § 87; see also MARMOR, supra note 96, at 152.
118. See MARMOR, supra note 96, at 153.
119. Compare WIT7GENSTEIN, supra note 96, § 100 ("'But still, it isn't a game if there is
some vagueness in the rules."-But does this prevent its being a game?... I want to say:
we misunderstand the role of the ideal in our language. That is to say: we too should call it
a game, only we are dazzled by the ideal and therefore fail to see the actual use of the word
'game' clearly."), with HART, supra note 3, at 152 ("[T]hough every rule may be doubtful
at some points, it is indeed a necessary condition of a legal system existing, that not every
rule is open to doubt on all points.").
120. HART, supra note 3, at 128, (citing Friedrich Waismann, Verifiability, in EssAYs ON
LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 117-30 (Anthony Flew ed., 1963)).
121. Waismann, supra note 120, at 123; see also Bix, supra note 105, at 10-14 (discussing
Waismann's concept of open texture).
1999]
SMU LAW REVIEW
which what we call gold simply behaves differently than we heretofore
experienced. Although there are specific ways in which Waismann's idea
that rules were necessarily "incomplete" may have been inconsistent with
Wittgenstein,122 Waismann clearly adopted the view that the standard in-
stances of an open-textured concept "provide the criteria for correct un-
derstanding of expressions." 123
Hart used the idea of open texture to point out that while all rules are
"theoretically ambiguous" or "possibly vague," only some subset of their
applications are "actually ambiguous" or actually vague. 2 4
This was a result of the fact that law occurs in a "natural language. '125
Nonetheless, open texture had a very specific application to law. Accord-
ing to Hart, because of open texture, every legal rule is characterized by
"indeterminacy of aim" and "indeterminacy of fact."'1 26 The former was
especially important in understanding why Fuller's purposive analysis was
seen by Hart to be a nonstarter. Given the Wittgensteinian view of a
rule, no single purpose could ever be constructed across all of its applica-
tions. To Hart, a common law precedent and the general language in a
statute were both illustrations of how standard instances marked out the
limits of vagueness. 127 The hypothetical author of Rule P, for example,
was presumed to have been a competent user of legal sentences when
they constructed Rule P. Therefore, it can be presumed that the author
knew that the rule could only have meaning to the extent that it could be
applied to its standard instances. Remember that according to Wittgen-
stein, a rule cannot have a nonlinguistic form.128 While there are other
sentences in which the standard instance would be what might be ambigu-
ous in Rule P (e.g., "No bicycles in the park") those sentences are not
Rule P. Regardless of whether the author chose to leave this point am-
biguous, or did so out of oversight, Rule P does not settle the
122. G.P. BAKER & P.M.S. HACKER, WITTGENSTEIN: UNDERSTANDING AND MEANING
432-33 (1980). Baker and Hacker argued that since it made no sense to speak of a rule
being complete, it made no sense to speak of a rule being incomplete. See id.
123. MARMOR, supra note 96, at 134; see also Bix, supra note 105, at 16 ("Waismann
agreed with Wittgenstein that our concepts are not completely defined/fully delimited/com-
pletely verifiable, that this 'ideal' could not be reached, and that this 'deficiency' had no
negative consequences for our use of language under normal circumstances.") (citations
omitted).
124. See Smith, supra note 99, at 171 (distinguishing between theoretical and actual
ambiguity); see also MARMOR, supra note 96, at 132-33 ("That Wittgenstein would sub-
scribe to the view that most of the words in our language are at least possibly vague is quite
[indisputable] yet one would be on safe ground in presuming that he would not have at-
tached great significance to this fact.").
125. See HART, supra note 3, at 128.
126. Id.
127. See id. Although Hart was emphatic that this was a feature of both legislation and
common law, he developed his theory most clearly in THE CONCEPT OF LAW through refer-
ence to legislation.
128. See WITrGENSTEIN, supra note 96, § 38 ("Can I say 'bububu' and mean 'If it
doesn't rain I shall go for a walk'?-lt is only in a language that I can mean something by
something. This shews clearly that the grammar of 'to mean' is not like that of the expres-
sion 'to imagine' and the like.").
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"unenvisaged case" of bicycles. 129 The same can be said of a law-applier
encountering an ambiguous precedent: the hypothetical author of "Hold-
ing P" is presumed to have been a competent user of legal sentences.
Holding P cannot apply outside of its set of standard instances. It is at
this point that the law-applier must "interpret" Holding P; interpretation
is required when a statement contains "[o]bscurities, ambiguities, or com-
plexities."' 13 Once the penumbral case is settled, the rule is extended: in
the case of statutory interpretation, by rendering more "determinate" the
law's initial aim and in the case of common law interpretation, by produc-
ing a precedent that may be as "determinate as any statutory rule."' 31 In
this way, the set of standard instances of the rule is increased and the
penumbra is reduced, although the "indeterminacy of fact" could cause it
to increase again.
IV.
The most important objection that Fuller could have made to Hart's
argument against purposive interpretation is that the Wittgensteinian
concept of rules may be right about language games, grammar, and math-
ematics, but it is inapplicable to law. As Brian Bix has argued, there is a
risk of "overreading" Wittgenstein's lessons for law, and Hart may have
fallen into that trap. 132 The phenomenology of rule-following in arithme-
tic or in speaking one's native language describes a "core" that has no
analog in law. When discussing arithmetic, "Disputes do not break out
(among mathematicians, say) over the question whether a rule has been
obeyed or not. People don't come to blows over it, for example."'
33
Wittgenstein thought that we could learn from very simple cases how we
could do much more complicated rule-driven activities. He certainly did
not think that the way one learned what "two" meant was only different
in degree from how one learned calculus. Knowing a grammar is basic to
knowing how to do everything else. 134 But that does not mean that
everything that depends upon the existence of a grammar is itself gram-
matical: "a phrase's grammar is constituted in part by the rules which
129. See HART, supra note 3, at 129. It would be a mistake to conclude that Hart's
statement that the penumbral case was "unenvisaged" implies that the standard instances
of Rule P were specifically envisaged when Rule P was promulgated. I take Hart merely to
be giving a causal explanation for how an alternative to Rule P might have come about; not
how Rule P necessarily came about.
130. P.M.S. Hacker, Language, Rules, and Pseudo-Rules, 8 LANGUAGE AND COMMUNI-
CATION 159, 168 (1988); see also MARMOR, supra note 96, at 154 ("Interpretation is re-
quired only when the formulation of the rule leaves doubts as to its applicability in a given
set of circumstances").
131. HART, supra note 3, at 129, 135.
132. See Bix, supra note 105, at 45-53 (citing Brian Langille, Revolution Without Foun-
dation: The Grammar of Scepticism and Law, 33 MCGILL L.J. 451 (1988)); see also Dennis
M. Patterson, Law's Pragmatism: Law as Practice and Narrative, 76 VA. L. REV. 937
(1990).
133. WrirGENSTEIN, supra note 96, § 240.
134. See Smith, supra note 99, at 183 ("The ability to abstract-to use a verbal formula,
to follow a rule, is secondary to our knowledge and facility with linguistic usage.").
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determine how that phrase can be used, such that if those rules are vio-
lated the resulting sentence will have no sense. ' 135 Certainly disputes do
break out between mathematicians over advanced theorems (even if they
do not come to blows), as well as scientists and literary critics, and in each
discipline there is lively debate over the "rules" of the discipline which
are sensible and profitable.136 Are we to say that except in their use of
arithmetic and basic vocabulary, mathematicians, scientists, and critics
spend all their time in the penumbra, not the core? If we say that (and it
might be the case that in most advanced fields, almost all argument takes
place in the penumbra) then the same should be true of law as well. It
would seem to be as much of a category mistake to talk about the "gram-
mar" of law as it would be to talk about the "grammar" of organic chem-
istry. As Bix argued, "Contrary to Wittgenstein's descriptions of
mathematicians and mathematical series, disputes do break out in law
over the question of whether a rule has been obeyed or not. Legal prac-
tice, locally and generally, is subject to criticism and is in need of further
justification.1'37
Furthermore, Wittgenstein said very little about what Hart called the
penumbra. For Wittgenstein, the examples he cared about (involving
simple rules) had two possible outcomes: successful applications of the
rule, and unsuccessful applications of the rule. 138 Vagueness, which
Wittgenstein accepted as a possibility, was not something which con-
fronted someone following a rule; vagueness was something that was en-
countered when the rule was applied to a non-standard instance. Hart's
solution in Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals was to de-
scribe judgment in the penumbra as "judicial legislation or even fiat." 139
But this description of what the law-applier does in the penumbra was
too quick. For Wittgenstein, a sentence that does not follow the rules of
its grammar is nonsense, not an invitation to make up a new rule. 140
There must be more to the penumbral case than the fact that it is an
instance that is non-standard: in other words, there must be some way to
know that it is a penumbral case and not merely nonsense. But Hart's
account seemed to assume that the law-applier already recognized the
relationship between the penumbral case and the rule. Hart did not ex-
plicitly state the basis of the relationship. On the one hand, by saying
that judgment in the penumbra was judicial legislation, Hart seemed to
have suggested that the law-applier was creating a new rule, not ex-
tending the old one. On the other hand, the expression "judicial legisla-
135. Bix, supra note 105, at 46.
136. See Radin, supra note 5, at 803.
137. Bix, supra note 105, at 48-49. But see Thomas Morawetz, Understanding Disa-
greement, the Root Issue of Jurisprudence: Applying Wittgenstein to Positivism, Critical The-
ory, and Judging, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 371, 398-401 (1992); McDowell, supra note 101, at
151-60 (applying Wittgensteinian analysis to the deliberation of complex or contested
questions).
138. See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 96, § 219; see also Bix, supra note 105, at 53.
139. Hart, supra note 1, at 629.
140. See WrTrGENSTEIN, supra note 96, § 199-200.
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tion" seemed to contradict the conventional view that statutory and
common law interpretation is a matter of extending or adding to an ex-
isting rule. This is why Fuller accused Hart's core/penumbra distinction
of being "unfaithful" to the law. 14'
By taking a Wittgensteinian approach to the theory of legal rules, Hart
solved some problems (it explained the core/penumbra distinction) but
raised some further difficulties (first, legal rules do not seem to behave
like Wittgensteinian rules, and second, Hart's theory seemed to suggest
that every interpretation in the penumbra created a new rule). Hart dealt
with these new problems in The Concept of Law; in fact, I will argue that
we cannot truly appreciate the Wittgensteinian foundations of Hart's the-
ory until we look carefully at Hart's distinction between primary and sec-
ondary rules. To see this, however, we will have to look first at how Hart
dealt with decisionmaking in the penumbra before he published The Con-
cept of Law.
Decisionmaking in the penumbra is decisionmaking that is not guided
by rules. It would seem, therefore, that when a law-applier made a deci-
sion in the penumbra, he or she was exercising discretion. Yet Hart used
the word "discretion" somewhat irregularly: although he incorporated it
fully in his chapter on the core/penumbra distinction in The Concept of
Law, 142 he used the word "discretion" only once in Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morality, and then only in reference to Fuller's
argument. 143 Instead of "discretion," in Positivism and the Separation of
Law and Morals Hart referred to "judicial legislation. '" 1 44 I think that the
meaning of discretion changed in Hart's mind during the late 1950s. I will
argue that until the theory of secondary rules had been fully developed,
Hart's concept of discretion raised problems for him, and these problems
reflected the difficulties raised by his use of a Wittgensteinian picture of
rules.
Despite the strange absence of the word "discretion" in Positivism and
the Separation of Law and Morals, Hart had written and discussed discre-
tion a great deal during his visit to Harvard in 1956-57. Hart participated
in Harvard's Legal Philosophy Discussion Group and presented a paper
entitled "Discretion" in which he presented many of the ideas that would
find their way into his Holmes lecture the following April. 145 In the pa-
per for the discussion group, Hart defined discretion as a concept that
possessed its own set of "central cases." 146 The central cases Hart identi-
fied fell into two groups. The first group he called "Express or Avowed
141. Hence the title of Fuller's response: Positivism and Fidelity to Law.
142. HART, supra note 3, at 110-23.
143. Hart, supra note 1, at 613.
144. Id. at 593.
145. H.L.A. Hart, Discretion (November 19, 1956) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with author).
146. See id. at 2.
After the characteristics of the central or clear cases of the exercise of discre-
tion have been distinguished we can then see that there will be many other
cases where only some of the cardinal features present in the clear case are
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Use of Discretion," which included rate-fixing by administrative agencies
and the application of standards of law (such as "reasonable care") in
torts sUits. 1 4 7 The second group Hart called "Tacit or Concealed Discre-
tion," which included the "interpretation of statutes" and the "use of pre-
cedent" by judges and juries. 148 In both its "express" and "tacit" forms,
discretion occupied a middle ground between whim and compulsion. 149
Thus, argued Hart, the key feature of discretion was that it involved a
choice between equally reasonable alternatives: "[W]e have in discretion
the sphere where arguments in favour of one decision or another may be
rational without being conclusive."'' 5 0 At the root of discretion, accord-
ing to Hart, was the fact that application of a law was always the result of
one norm or value trumping another. Hart thought that every individual
law contained competing norms. Hart termed this problem the "Indeter-
minacy of Aim" and argued that it characterized both statutes and com-
mon law. For example, he argued that Rule P contains both (or at least)
the norm of "peace in the park" and "the pleasure to use [certain] ob-
jects."15' Similarly, Hart argued that the negligence standard contained
both the norm of the reduction of "substantial harm" and the norm of
"precautions ... such that the burden ... does not involve too great a
sacrifice of other respectable interests.1152 In core cases, one norm was
clearly selected over another, but in penumbral cases, the conflict be-
tween the norms remained open, and a choice had to be made between
the two. The only difference between "avowed" and "tacit" discretion
was a matter of degree; the former made no pretense at setting out stan-
dard instances of a rule that occupied the core, while the latter offered a
set of standard instances either through the language of the statute or the
holdings of a precedent. 153 But ultimately the demand that the rule-ap-
plier choose between competing norms would be the same in both sets of
cases.
It is clear that Hart's Harvard paper paralleled Positivism and the Sepa-
ration of Law and Morals. The paper helps us see what it was about
Hart's theory of discretion that so offended Fuller. The key assumption
upon which Hart's view of discretion relied was that in every law there
were competing norms which, although settled in the core, had to be set-
tled by the law-applier in the penumbra. Hart ended Positivism and the
Separation of Law and Morals by stressing his rejection of the idea that a
present and where we would hesitate or disagree as to the classification of
them as cases of discretion.
Id.
147. Id. at 4.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 8. ("Discretion occupies an intermediate place between choices dictated by
purely personal or momentary whim and those which are made to give effect to clear meth-
ods of reaching clear aims or to conform to rules whose application to the particular case is
obvious.").
150. Id. at 15.
151. Id. at 12-13.
152. Id. at 13.
153. See id. at 5.
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law instantiated a single, coherent norm: "Within the framework of rela-
tively well-settled law there jostle too many alternatives too nearly equal
in attraction between which judge and lawyer must uncertainly pick their
way .... -154 This is, of course, the opposite of monism.
The problem with Hart's analysis was that it did not explain how a
choice between two norms was connected to the standard instances of a
given rule. For example, Hart was sure that there was a difference be-
tween the exercise of discretion by an administrative agency determining
a "fair" rate and a judge determining whether a bicycle was a vehicle.
But given what he argued in his Harvard talk, the difference was ad hoc:
in the former case, no standard instances had been set out "ab initio,"
while in the latter case, there were some standard instances. 155 This dif-
ference would matter only if the standard instances played some role in
the law-applier's judgment in the penumbra. But what role could that
be? If discretion is the act of choosing between two norms that are both
within the law, how others had performed when faced with a similar
choice in the past would seem at best to have practical, not legal,
significance.
The problem with Hart's picture of discretion was that the standard
instance of a rule not only seemed to establish how the rule was to be
applied in that instance, but also how the rule-applier should approach
the penumbra. Neither Hart's Harvard paper nor Positivism and the Sep-
aration of Law and Morals gave any reason to believe that the choices
made in the penumbra were controlled by the standard instance of the
rule. Henry Hart, who gave a paper entitled The Place of Discretion in the
Legal System shortly after Hart's paper, criticized Hart's concept of dis-
cretion for its failure to explain how judgment was controlled in the pe-
numbra. 156 In his outline for the talk, Henry Hart wrote, "The alternative
to discretion: An obligation of reasoned elaboration of the grounds of
decision. ' 157 "Reasoned elaboration," of course, was a term of art devel-
oped by Henry Hart and Albert Sacks in their book, The Legal Process,
which, although unofficially completed in 1958, existed in draft form in
1956.158 The phrase "reasoned elaboration" described how a legal rule
was supposed to be applied in the penumbra. It had to meet a "double
test": first, the application had to be consistent with every other applica-
tion of the same rule, and second, it had to "best serve" the principles and
154. Hart, supra note 1, at 629.
155. See Hart, supra note 145, at 4, 12-13.
156. Henry Hart, The Place of Discretion in the Legal System 2 (November 20, 1956)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
157. Id. On the outline someone (Henry Hart?) had crossed out "elaboration" and
written in its place "explanation."
158. THE LEGAL PROCESS is known to have gone through four versions between 1955
and 1958 and was never completed. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The
Making of THE LEGAL PROCESS, 107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2040-41 (1994). THE LEGAL
PROCESS was "officially" published in 1994. See HENRY M. HART & ALBERT M. SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (Wil-
liam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
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policies expressed by the rule.159 Although Hart and Sacks agreed with
Hart's definition of discretion,16° they did not think that reasoned elabo-
ration was discretion. 161 Apparently, Hart and Sacks thought that if rea-
soned elaboration required a rule-applier to pick the norm that "best
served" the legal rule, then one could not say that "two or more courses
of action" were available to the rule-applier. Contrary to what Hart had
argued, the standard instance of the rule could affect what was chosen in
the penumbra. It is interesting to note, however, that while Hart and
Sacks disagreed with Hart over the question of whether law-appliers ex-
ercised discretion during the interpretation of statutes or common law,
they agreed with Hart that law-appliers exercised discretion in adminis-
trative law-the area Hart had called "avowed discretion." According to
Hart and Sacks, in administrative law, "it is not feasible.., to reduce [the
law] to the form of rules, perfected and inchoate, and standards which are
sufficiently definite to eliminate the need for discretion in filling in their
meaning.' 62 Hart and Sacks argued that lawmakers reverted to adminis-
trative law when they wanted to delegate to others the formation of the
very norms that would otherwise form the basis of reasoned elabora-
tion.163 But this agreement between Hart and Sacks on the ineliminable
presence of discretion in administrative law suggests to me that the prob-
lem with Hart's Harvard paper and Positivism and the Separation of Law
and Morals was not his insistence that discretion occurs in the penumbra
in the application of any type of law, but that his distinction between
"avowed" and "tacit" discretion was ill-conceived.
V.
As we saw above, the distinction Hart drew between avowed and tacit
discretion seemed ad hoc: it was based on nothing more than whether the
law-applier was given standard instances of the application of the law or
not. As Hart and Sacks pointed out in The Legal Process, the difference
between the guidance a law-applier received in the case of what Hart
159. HART & SACKS, supra note 158, at 147.
160. See id. at 144 ("For purposes of these materials, discretion means the power to
choose between two or more courses of action each of which is thought as permissible.").
161. In these circumstances there may be thought to be a justification for
describing the act of interpretation as one of discretion, even within the defi-
nition which has been given. But this would be to obscure what seems to be
the vital point-namely, the effort, and the importance of the effort, of each
individual deciding officer to reach what he thinks is the right answer.
Id. at 149-50. Hart and Sack's concept of discretion was very similar to the concept
deployed by Ronald Dworkin in Judicial Discretion, 60 J. PHIL. 624 (1963). Dworkin ar-
gued that a decisionmaker does not have discretion if in implementing a policy, he/she
cannot choose the standard upon which the choice is based. See id. at 630-31. Dworkin
later argued that the fact that a decisionmaker has a wide range of choice in the application
of a standard, or that the decisionmaker's application of the standard cannot be reviewed,
are not instances of real discretion, but merely features of "weak" discretion. See RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 32 (1977). Dworkin's "weak discretion" is simply
the equivalent, I think, of Hart and Sacks's concept of reasoned elaboration.
162. HART & SACKS, supra note 158, at 150.
163. See id. at 151-52.
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called tacit discretion (what Hart and Sacks called reasoned elaboration)
and a case of avowed discretion (what Hart and Sacks called noncontinu-
ing discretion) had to do with the kind of reasons a law-applier could use
to make a decision. 164 I think that Hart and Sacks were just as wrong as
Hart to draw an ad hoc distinction between reasoned elaboration and
noncontinuing discretion: there is some degree of discretion in the appli-
cation of all forms of law, regardless of whether it is statutory, decisional
or administrative. But Hart and Sacks were correct to see that the form
of law could determine (a) the degree of discretion used and (b) the types
of norms among which the law-applier would be required to choose.' 65
Hart and Sacks's great insight was that different types of legal rules per-
mit different degrees of discretion, and that a complex legal system needs
rules that can distinguish between varying degrees of discretion:
[Llegal words are vehicles for a delegation of power from user to
some addressee. The delegation is not an unlimited one. How the
addressee should use his power is a question to which it will be nec-
essary to give much attention. For the present three points are im-
portant: first, that the delegation again and again is there; second,
that it is in part a matter of necessity; and third, that it may be a
matter also of deliberate choice. t 66
I believe that Hart tried to deal with the criticisms raised by Hart and
Sacks in The Concept of Law. 167 In chapter seven, he combined the argu-
ment about discretion from his Harvard paper with the core/penumbra
argument from Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals and ad-
ded a new twist by framing both arguments against a discussion of the
different types of law found in a complex legal system. Hart began the
chapter by discussing the problem of a judge in applying a rule like Rule
P under conditions of indeterminacy: "The discretion thus left to him by
language may be very wide; so that if he applies the rule, the conclusion,
even though it may not be arbitrary or irrational, is in effect a choice. ' 168
Then he discussed legislation, which is indeterminate by design, where
"the sphere to be legally controlled is recognized from the start as one in
which the features of individual cases will vary so much ... that uniform
rules ... cannot usefully be framed by the legislature in advance."'1 69 In
these sorts of cases, administrative agencies "must exercise a discre-
tion." 1 71 The third sort of rule he discussed is the common law; in torts for
164. See id. at 143.
165. See id. at 145-58.
166. Id. at 139 (footnote omitted).
167. Although Hart and Sacks were critical of H.L.A. Hart's theory of discretion, they
were not hostile to the fundamental principles of legal positivism. See ANTHONY J. SEBOK,
LEGAL PosITIvIsM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 113-178 (1998). Hart's inability to de-
fend his theory of discretion may have contributed to Hart and Sacks's failure to discuss
their deep differences with Fuller in THE LEGAL PROCESS, although there were other fac-
tors at work as well. See id. at 160-68 (discussing the influence of contemporary political
science on the reception of Fuller's coherence theory by the legal process movement).
168. HART, supra note 3, at 127.
169. Id. at 131.
170. Id. at 132.
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example, "our aim of securing people against harm is indeterminate till
we put it in conjunction with, or test it against, possibilities which only
experience will bring.' 17' Next, Hart contrasted common law with a
criminal statute having "the area of open texture," such as a murder stat-
ute or a traffic ordinance. 172 Next, he noted that the rules of precedent
allow a court to treat holdings the way they treat statutes, as rules with
open texture. 73 He concluded by drawing the following picture of the
relationship between the core and the penumbra:
The open texture of the law means that there are, indeed, areas of
conduct where much must be left to be developed by courts or offi-
cials striking a balance, in the light of circumstances, between com-
peting interests which vary in weight from case to case. None the
less, the life of the law consists to a very large extent. in the guidance
both of officials and private individuals by determinate rules which,
unlike the applications of variable standards, do not require from
them a fresh judgment from case to case. This salient fact of social
life remains true, even though uncertainties may break out as to the
applicability of any rule (whether written or communicated by prece-
dent) to a concrete case.' 74
This passage reversed the core and penumbra metaphor in Positivism
and the Separation of Law and Morals: uncertainty is now at the center,
bounded by legal rules. In setting out the list above, Hart described how
different sorts of laws were appropriate to provide different degrees of
open texture: administrative law was marked by a great deal of discretion
which was appropriate to the ends it served, whereas criminal law was
marked by a very small degree of discretion.
By focusing on the different types of law in a legal system, Hart was not
interested in merely describing the specific amount of open texture in
these different types of law. He wanted to confront the fact that a legal
system could be designed so that rule-appliers could know in advance
what sort of law they were dealing with and respond accordingly. The
question that I think Hart was trying to answer was the question I raised
earlier: How could a law-applier know that a case was in the penumbra?
What rule told them that? The answer: the secondary rules of the legal
system. The distinction between primary and secondary rules is at the
heart of The Concept of Law. Hart argued that if modern legal systems
are built out of rules, not commands, then legal positivism must explain
how different rules are created, changed, and identified. Hart built on the
insight that law both limits and expands liberty, and argued that rules that
limit liberty are "primary" rules, while rules that confer powers are "sec-
ondary" rules.175 There are three types of secondary rules. There are
rules that confer the power to change primary rules. Hart included in this
171. Id. at 133.
172. Id. at 134.
173. See id. at 134-35.
174. Id. at 135.
175. See id. at 94.
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category the rules of legislation and the powers of private law making
("the making of wills, contracts, transfers of property"). 176 There are
rules that confer the power to adjudicate primary rules. These rules de-
termine whether "a [primary] rule has been broken."' 177 But the most
important type of secondary rule is the "rule of recognition." This rule
sets out the conditions that must be satisfied by a norm if it is to count as
a primary rule. 178
Under normal conditions, the secondary rules operate very much like a
grammar. 17 9 Hart described the rule of recognition as an "ultimate" rule;
it "provides criteria for the assessment of the validity of other rules; but it
is also unlike [the other rules] in that there is no rule providing criteria
for the assessment of its own legal validity."'' Hart was very careful to
insist that he did not mean that the rule of recognition could not be
judged according to non-legal standards; his point was, however, that the
rule of recognition serves as the measure of legal validity and therefore
cannot be judged by a legal standard. This is because
[w]e only need the word 'validity', and commonly only use it, to an-
swer questions which arise within a system of rules . . . .No such
question can arise as to the validity of the very rule of recognition
which provides the criteria; it can neither be valid nor invalid but is
simply accepted as appropriate for use in this way. 18 1
This sounds very similar to Wittgenstein's argument that the applica-
176. Id. at 96.
177. Id. at 97.
178. See id. at 94-95. As Coleman and Leiter note, unlike the other two secondary rules,
the rule of recognition is not a power-conferring rule. See Jules L. Coleman & Brian
Leiter, Legal Positivism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY
245 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
179. I want to be very careful to set aside Hart's discussion of the rule of recognition
under circumstances of total revolution or foreign occupation. Where the legal officials of
a legal system accept the secondary rules as common public standards of official behavior,
but "there is no longer general obedience to the rules" then at some point, Hart acknowl-
edges, the legal system ceases to exist. HART, supra note 3, at 118. These sorts of cases are
not important for the comparison of the rule of recognition with Wittgenstein's theory of
rules in this Article, since the analogy would be to two languages at war with each other,
not a language in which the rules of grammar are in dispute. See, e.g., LUDWIG WrTGEN-
STEIN, ON CERTAINTY 80 (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von Wright eds., Denis Paul &
G.E.M. Anscombe trans., 1969) ("Supposing we met people who... consult[ed] an oracle
[to make important decisions] ... If we call this 'wrong' aren't we using our language-game
as a base from which to combat theirs?"). On the other hand, a more apt parallel is the
circumstance where there is a breakdown over the identification of the rule of recognition
among the legal officials: "It may be that, over certain constitutional issues and only over
those, there is a division within the official world ultimately leading to a division among the
judiciary." HART, supra note 3, at 122 (emphasis added). This would be analogous to
members of a linguistic community openly arguing over the basic grammar of their lan-
guage. While such disputes can occur within members of the same language-game, they
are, as Hart noted, abnormal episodes which must be seen as a failure of the rule of recog-
nition, not an application of it. See id. Hart gave as an example the attempt by the South
African parliament to severely restrict the power of judicial review. See id. at 122-23 (cit-
ing Harris v. Donges, 1 TLR 1245 (1954) (describing Harris as a "substandard, abnormal
case")).
180. HART, supra note 3, at 107.
181. Id. at 108-09.
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tion of a rule is "fixed" by the forms of life, not by further rules. 182 Hart
noted that some critics thought the rule of recognition must be incoher-
ent, since it was a legal rule that could not be validated through legal
analysis. 183 Hart responded that to say the validity of the rule of recogni-
tion cannot be demonstrated through legal reasons is simply like saying
"that we assume, but can never demonstrate, that the standard metre bar
in Paris which is the ultimate test of the correctness of all measurement in
metres, is itself correct."' 84 The rule of recognition, like the word "metre"
cannot be demonstrated; it is part of the language game that makes argu-
ment possible. We should note that Wittgenstein first used the example
of the "metre bar in Paris" to make the point that the fundamental rules
of a system are not susceptible to validation:
There is one thing of which one can say neither that it is one metre
long, nor that it is not one metre long, and that is the standard metre
in Paris. But this is, of course, not to ascribe any extraordinary prop-
erty to it, but only to mark its peculiar role in the language-game of
measuring with a metre-rule. 185
The rule of recognition (and the rules of adjudication, which for pur-
poses of this argument should be seen as part of the rule of recognition) is
directed towards legal officials, not citizens. 186
As Jules Coleman has noted, the rule of recognition can have an episte-
mic function. 87 Hart distinguished between two types of epistemic func-
tions: validation and identification. The rule of recognition serves a
validation function when it "enable[s] relevant officials to judge the valid-
ity of official actions."' 18 8 The rule of recognition serves an identifying
function when it helps ordinary citizens determine "which of the commu-
nity's norms [are] binding on them."'189
However, the rule of recognition is "fundamentally" a validation
rule. 190 It is directed towards legal officials, not citizens. Therefore, the
rule of recognition does not identify primary rules; it is not used to iden-
182. See supra text accompanying note 109; see also WIrTTGENSTEIN, supra note 96,
§ 224 ("The word 'agreement' and the word 'rule' are related to one another, they are
cousins"). Frederick Schauer argued that the rule of recognition, being a practice, should
not be called a rule at all. See Frederick Schauer, Amending the Presuppositions of a Con-
stitution, in RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION 145, 150 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) (citing
A.W.B. Simpson, The Common Law and Legal Theory, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRU-
DENCE, 2ND SERIES 77-99 (A.W.B. Simpson ed., 1973)). Once we see that by "rule" Hart
could have meant a "form of life," Schauer's objection is probably cured.
183. See HART, supra note 3, at 111.
184. Id. at 109.
185. WrrrGENSTEIN, supra note 96, § 50.
186. See HART, supra note 3, at 116 (stating that the "rules of recognition specifying the
criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively ac-
cepted as common public standards of official behavior by its officials," emphasis added)).
187. See Jules L. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, l1 J. LEO. STuD. 139, 141
(1982).
188. Jules L. Coleman, Authority and Reason in THE AU-rHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON
LEGAL POSITIVIsM 291 (Robert George ed., 1996).
189. Id.
190. See id. at 292.
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tify when a citizen ought to act or forbear from some action. The rule of
recognition validates the actions of other legal officials-for example, it
tells when an act of Parliament or a lower court decision is law.19 1 The
legal officials must agree, of course, on the identification of the rule of
recognition, but that is not the same thing as saying that the rule of recog-
nition has an identifying function. 192
In its validation function, the rule of recognition behaves like a
Wittgensteinian rule. While the legal officials may disagree over some of
the applications of the primary rules in the legal system (hence the disa-
greement over the interpretation of the primary rules) they generally do
not disagree over the application of the rule of recognition. That is to
say, in general, disputes do not break out among legal officials over
"whether" to apply the rule of recognition in a given case. 193 Further-
more, given a complex rule of recognition, the rules of adjudication and
change (the other secondary rules) are not often in dispute; although the
rules concerning precedent and parliamentary supremacy do change over
time, they change in the same way that rules of a language game change:
gradually, imperceptibly, and rarely through the application of legal
rules.194 The rule of recognition, argued Hart, has a "peculiar role" in the
language game of law. Unlike all the other rules of the legal system,
191. See Coleman, supra note 188, at 293. Coleman, in his essay with Brian Leiter on
legal positivism, argues that Hart's original dichotomy between primary and secondary
rules really is a trichotomy. The secondary rules that create the power to legislate and
adjudicate are not like the secondary rule of recognition, since the former are power-con-
ferring rules but the latter is not: "Hart really believes that there are three kinds of legal
rules: those that obligate, those that enable and the rule of recognition that sets out validity
conditions." Coleman & Leiter, supra note 178, at 245.
192. See HART, supra note 3, at 258-59; see also Coleman & Leiter, supra note 178, at
252 ("That a rule of recognition may be controversial in its instantiations, however, does
not entail that judges disagree about what the rule is. They disagree, perhaps, only about
what it requires. In that case, they do not disagree about what the validation standard is,
only about what it validates.").
193. Hart recognized that the rule of recognition itself had a penumbra. See HART,
supra note 3, at 148. But Hart stressed that there were two important differences between
rule-application in the penumbra of the secondary rules and rule-application in the penum-
bra of the primary rules. The first difference was simply one of degree: disputes over the
application of the rule of recognition are infrequent and occur at the "fringe." See id. at
148, 154. Second, Hart noted that unlike primary rules, in which (as I have argued in this
article) the exercise of discretion is controlled by law through the secondary rules, the
exercise of discretion in the penumbra of secondary rules is not controlled by law at all.
See id. at 153. Although sometimes disputes over the application of the rule of recognition
are settled by courts, the judiciary's success at settling a dispute of constitutional dimen-
sions is an exercise of political, not legal, judgment: "[Wihen courts settle previously
unenvisaged questions concerning the most fundamental constitutional rules, they get their
authority to decide them accepted after the questions have arisen and the decision has
been given. Here all that succeeds is success." Id.
194. The transformation of the doctrine of precedent in English law illustrates this. As
Hart noted, in Rex v. Taylor, 2 K.B. 368 [1950], the court said that it had "always" had the
power to review its own precedents concerning the liberty of a subject, even though it had
gradually accumulated this power and used the decision as an opportunity to promote the
fiction that it had no such thing: "[H[ere power acquire[d] authority ex post facto from
success." Id. at 154. In 1966, after THE CONCEPT OF LAW was published, the House of
Lords "announced" that it had determined that it could depart from its own precedents as
a matter of law, something which they had arguably been doing in practice for many years.
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whose "existence" depends on the satisfaction of the criteria of validity in
the legal system, the rule of recognition "exists only as a complex, but
normally concordant, practice of the courts ... [i]ts existence is a matter
of fact."' 195
This is important because it helps Hart explain how a law-applier can
treat disagreement over the validation of the application of primary rules
as more than just nonsense. The secondary rules do not identify the pri-
mary rules, but they do tell a judge how to approach the task of validation
in a dispute over the application of primary rules. As Hart put it, for
judges to perform their validating function they must be able to identify
"settled law" (read: the core), and "for that to be possible a rule of recog-
nition specifying the sources of law and the relationships of superiority
and subordination holding between them is necessary.1196 In other words,
the secondary rules may tell a judge, for example, how to identify
whether a precedent has already been established by another court, or
how to identify a legislative act or an administrative ruling relevant to the
question. In doing so, the core is identified by the judge without the fresh
application of the primary rule. The rule of recognition identifies the
standard instances of the primary rule by their form: precedent, statutory
language, or regulatory standards. In doing so, the secondary rules set
out the point at which interpretation begins, and illustrate the breadth of
the law-applier's scope of interpretation. The scope depends, to borrow
Hart's opaque expression, on the "relationships of superiority and subor-
dination holding between" the application in question and the standard
instance.197
I have argued that Hart's adoption of a Wittgensteinian picture of
rules, which, as some observers have pointed out, seems ill-suited to the
vast majority of primary rules in a legal system, makes sense if the secon-
dary rules are seen as part of the "grammar of law" that sets out the
beginning point and scope of discretion in the application of the primary
rules. According to my argument, Hart's concept of discretion is intelligi-
ble only within the framework of primary and secondary rules. Whereas
Hart in his Harvard talk was incapable of explaining to Hart and Sacks
how standard instances of different types of law could direct the exercise
of discretion by a law applier in the penumbra, Hart was able to provide
an answer in The Concept of Law. The secondary rules, especially the
rule of recognition, establish the scope of discretion by identifying for the
law applier not only the standard instances of the legal rule at issue, but
also what type of legal rule is at issue, and, therefore, the range of norms
See LORD DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW 296-97 (1979) (citing The Lord Chancellor's
Statement in the House of Lords, July 26, 1966).
195. HART, supra note 3, at 110. Compare with Wittgenstein: "'If humans were not in
general agreed about the colours of things, if undetermined cases were not exceptional,
then our concept of colour could not exist.' No-our concept would not exist." LUDWIG
WITTrENSTEIN, ZETTEL § 351 (G.E.M. Anscombe & G.H. von Wright eds., G.E.M. An-
scombe, trans., 1970).
196. HART, supra note 3, at 266.
197. Id.
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that are available to the law applier when exercising discretion. Hart
would no longer need to appeal to the fiction that what distinguishes
common law from administrative law is that the former simply has more
standard instances available than the latter, but could say instead that the
former is characterized by one set of rules for identifying standard in-
stances (rules of precedent, for example) and the latter by another set of
rules (rules about the practice of administrative agencies). This is com-
patible with Hart's claim that the secondary rules do not identify primary
rules but instead establish the conditions under which primary rules are
validated by law-appliers; those "conditions" are the standard instances
of the various types of law discussed in The Legal Process and The Con-
cept of Law.
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